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Abstract
Ebola virus disease has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in
particular criteria of Article 7 on disease proﬁle and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of Ebola virus
disease to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of Ebola virus disease according to disease
prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to Ebola
virus disease. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information
collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was
reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the
questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details
on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the
assessment performed, Ebola virus disease can be considered eligible to be listed for Union
intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease would comply with the criteria as in
Sections 4 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control
rules referred to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1). The animal species to be listed for Ebola virus
disease according to Article 8(3) criteria are some species of non-human primates, pigs and rodents as
susceptible species and some species of fruit bats as reservoir, as indicated in the present opinion.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
The background and Terms of Reference (ToR) as provided by the European Commission for the
present document are reported in Section 1.2 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology
followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the criteria of
Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9, and 8 within the Animal Health Law (AHL) framework (EFSA
AHAW Panel, 2017).
1.2. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
The interpretation of the ToR is as in Section 1.2 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc
methodology followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the
criteria of Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9, and 8 within the AHL framework (EFSA AHAW
Panel, 2017).
The present document reports the results of assessment on Ebola virus disease according to the
criteria of the AHL articles as follows:
• Article 7: Ebola virus disease proﬁle and impacts
• Article 5: eligibility of Ebola virus disease to be listed
• Article 9: categorisation of Ebola virus disease according to disease prevention and control
rules as in Annex IV
• Article 8: list of animal species related to Ebola virus disease.
2. Data and methodologies
The methodology applied in this opinion is described in detail in a dedicated document about the
ad hoc method developed for assessing any animal disease for the listing and categorisation of
diseases within the AHL framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
3. Assessment
3.1. Assessment according to Article 7 criteria
This section presents the assessment of Ebola virus disease according to the Article 7 criteria of the
AHL and related parameters (see Table 2 of the opinion on methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017)),
based on the information contained in the fact-sheet as drafted by the selected disease scientist (see
section 2.1 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology) and amended by the AHAW Panel.
3.1.1. Article 7(a) Disease Proﬁle
Ebola virus (EV) disease (previously known as Ebola haemorrhagic fever) is a zoonotic disease
of major concern for human health and certain African wildlife. The disease is caused by four of
the ﬁve recognised species of the genus Ebola: Ebolavirus (formerly known as Zaire ebolavirus),
Sudan ebolavirus, Bundibugyo ebolavirus and Ta€ı Forest ebolavirus (Feldmann and Geisbert, 2011;
Rougeron et al., 2015; CDC, online-e; WHO, online-f).
3.1.1.1. Article 7(a)(i) Animal species concerned by the disease
Susceptible animal species
Parameter 1 – Naturally susceptible wildlife species (or family/orders)
Species that develop viral haemorrhagic fever, in which the virus has been isolated:
• Western gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) (Leroy et al., 2004a; Rouquet et al., 2005; Wittmann et al.,
2007; Reed et al., 2014)
• Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) (Georges-Courbot et al., 1997a; Formenty et al., 1999; Georges
et al., 1999; Leroy et al., 2004a; Rouquet et al., 2005; Wittmann et al., 2007)
• Bay duiker (Cephalophus dorsalis) (Rouquet et al., 2005)
AHL assessment on Ebola virus disease
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Species with asymptomatic infection, in which viral nucleic acids have been detected:
• Franquet’s epauletted fruit bat (Epomops franqueti) (Leroy et al., 2005; Pourrut et al., 2007,
2009; Hayman et al., 2012)
• Hammer-headed fruit bat (Hypsignathus monstrosus) (Leroy et al., 2005; Pourrut et al., 2007,
2009; Hayman et al., 2012)
• Little collared fruitbat (Myonycteris torquata) (Leroy et al., 2005; Pourrut et al., 2007, 2009)
• Peters’ mouse (Mus setulosus) (Morvan et al., 1999)
• Praomys spp. (Morvan et al., 1999)
• Greater forest shrew (Sylvisorex ollula) (Morvan et al., 1999)
Species with asymptomatic infection, in which antibodies have been detected (WHO, online-f):
• Egyptian fruit bat (Rousettus aegyptiacus) (Pourrut et al., 2009)
• Leschenault’s rousette (Rousettus leschenaultii) (Olival et al., 2013)
• Gambian epauletted fruit bat (Epomophorus gambianus) (Hayman et al., 2012)
• African straw-coloured fruit bat (Eidolon helvum) (Hayman et al., 2010; Ogawa et al., 2015)
• Peter’s lesser epauletted fruit bat (Micropteropus pusillus) (Pourrut et al., 2009)
• Angolan free-tailed bat (Mops condylura) (Pourrut et al., 2009)
Species of captive, wild-born animals that have been exposed to the virus with unknown history of
symptoms and in which antibodies have been detected:
• Mandrill (Mandrillus sphinx) (Leroy et al., 2004b)
• Drill (Mandrillus leucophaeus) (Leroy et al., 2004b)
• Olive baboon (Papio Anubis) (Leroy et al., 2004b)
• De Brazza’s monkey (Cercopithecus neglectus) (Leroy et al., 2004b)
Full host range is not known. Observed mortality in other wildlife indicates that additional species
might be susceptible to Ebola, e.g. among the mandrills (Mandrillus sp.), guenon (Cercopithecus sp.)
and other nonhuman primates, as well as forest antelopes (Cephalophus sp.), bush pigs
(Potamochoerus porcus), brush-tailed porcupines (Atherurus africanus) and other species (Lahm et al.,
2007; Olson et al., 2012; Olivero et al., 2017).
Parameter 2 – Naturally susceptible domestic species (or family/orders)
Species that have been exposed to the virus with unknown history of symptoms and from which
antibodies have been detected:
• Dogs (Allela et al., 2005; WHO, online-f)
• Guinea pigs (Stansﬁeld et al., 1982)
Parameter 3 – Experimentally susceptible wildlife species (or family/orders)
Susceptible species that develop viral haemorrhagic fever:
• Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) (Geisbert et al., 2015)
• Cynomolgus macaques (Macaca fascicularis) (Geisbert et al., 2015)
• Marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) (Smither et al., 2015)
• Baboon (Papio spp.) (Perry et al., 2012)
• African green monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) (Davis et al., 1997)
• Vervet monkey (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) (Bowen et al., 1978)
Susceptible species that develop asymptomatic infection, in which nucleic acids were detected and
seroconverted (WHO, online-f):
• Egyptian rousette fruit bat (Rousettus aegyptiacus) (Jones et al., 2015; Paweska et al., 2016)
• Wahlberg’s epauletted fruit bat (Epomophorus wahlbergi) (Swanepoel et al., 1996)
• Angolan free-tailed bat (Mops condylurus) (Swanepoel et al., 1996)
• Little free-tailed bat (Tadarida pumila, i.e. Chaerephon pumilus) (Swanepoel et al., 1996)
Species susceptible to species-adapted strains only (WHO, online-f):
• Mice (Banadyga et al., 2016; Cheresiz et al., 2016)
• Syrian hamster (Mesocricetus auratus) (Wahl-Jensen et al., 2012; Ebihara et al., 2013)
AHL assessment on Ebola virus disease
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Parameter 4 – Experimentally susceptible domestic species (or family/orders)
Species that develop viral haemorrhagic fever:
• Domestic ferret (Mustela putorius furo) (Cross et al., 2016; Kozak et al., 2016)
Species that develop respiratory disease symptoms:
• Pigs (Kobinger et al., 2011; Weingartl et al., 2012)
Species susceptible to species-adapted strains only4:
• Guinea pigs (Banadyga et al., 2016; Cheresiz et al., 2016)
Species insensitive to infection, no detection of virus nucleic acid but seroconverted (animals
purposely inoculated to produce hyperimmune serum):
• Goats (Dedkova, 1993; Kudoyarova-Zubavichene et al., 1999)
• Sheep (Dedkova, 1993; Kudoyarova-Zubavichene et al., 1999)
• Horses (Krasnianskii et al., 1995; Zheng et al., 2016)
Parameter 5 – Wild reservoir species (or family/orders)
This is not fully understood, but fruit bats have long been suspected to be reservoir species
because: (1) studies have shown asymptomatic infections in the wild and in experimental studies, (2)
13 wild caught specimens have harboured viral nucleic acid, (3) antibodies have been detected in
several species, and (4) contact to bats have been suspected to be the origin of human epidemics in
West Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan (WHO, 1978; Baron et al., 1983; Leroy et al.,
2005; Pourrut et al., 2007; Leroy et al., 2009; Pourrut et al., 2009; Hayman et al., 2010, 2012; Olival
et al., 2013; Marı Saez et al., 2015; Ogawa et al., 2015).
However, natural shedding of the virus has not been reported and the virus has not been isolated
from wild bats. The suspected links between bats and human outbreaks have not been conﬁrmed and
further research is necessary to conﬁrm or identify reservoir species. Great apes (family Hominidae,
e.g. chimpanzees and gorillas) are not considered reservoirs given the disease’s rapid spread and high
case fatality in these species, i.e. they do not fulﬁl important criteria for a reservoir host (Huijbregts
et al., 2003; Olival and Hayman, 2014; Leendertz et al., 2016).
The susceptibility of Barbary macaque, bat and monkey species present in the European Union (EU)
overseas territory is not known.
Parameter 6 – Domestic reservoir species (or family/orders)
There are no species recognised so far.
3.1.1.2. Article 7(a)(ii) The morbidity and mortality rates of the disease in animal
populations
Morbidity
Parameter 1 – Prevalence/Incidence
See Table 1.
Parameter 2 – Case-morbidity rate (% clinically diseased animals out of infected ones)
The case-morbidity rate is unknown.
AHL assessment on Ebola virus disease
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Mortality
Parameter 3 – Case-fatality rate
Table 1: Seroprevalence and mortality in Ebola-infected animal populations. There are no data on
the case-morbidity rate (% clinically diseased animals out of infected ones)
Species (references)
Seroprevalence
% (n samples)
Mortality Country
Time
period
Bats (Leroy et al., 2005; Pourrut et al.,
2007, 2009; Hayman et al., 2010, 2012;
Olival et al., 2013;
Ogawa et al., 2015)
Franquet’s epauletted fruit bat(Epomops
franqueti)
7 (117) None Gabon 2004
3.9 (355) None Gabon/ROC 2003–2005
1.4 (370) None Gabon/ROC 2006
4 (805) None Gabon/ROC 2003–2008
11 (27) None Ghana 2008
Hammer-headed fruit bat (Hypsignathus
monstrosus)
24 (17) None Gabon 2001–2003
5.6 (67) None Gabon/ROC 2003–2005
2.2 (44) None Gabon/ROC 2006
7 (125) None Gabon/ROC 2003–2008
12.5 (16) None Ghana 2008
Little collared fruit bat (Myonycteris
torquata)
7 (54) None Gabon 2001–2003
3.9 (231) None Gabon/ROC 2003–2005
0.3 (323) None Gabon/ROC 2006
3 (573) None Gabon/ROC 2003–2008
Egyptian rousette (Rousettus aegyptiacus) 8 (307) None Gabon/ROC 2003–2008
Leschenault’s rousette (Rousettus
leschenaultii)
3.5 (37) None Bangladesh 2010–2011
Gambian epauletted fruit bat
(Epomophorus gambianus)
11 (37) None Ghana 2008
African straw-coloured fruit bat (Eidolon
helvum)
1 positive
specimen (262)
None Ghana 2008–2009
9.5 (748) None Gambia 2006–2013
Peter’s lesser epauletted fruit bat
(Micropteropus pusillus)
2 (197) None Gabon/ROC 2003–2008
Insectivorous bats incl. Angolan free-
tailed bat (Mops condylurus) and Giant
Leaf-nosed Bat (Hipposideros gigas)
12 (24) None Gabon/ROC 2003–2008
Rodents/Shrew (Morvan et al., 1999)
Peters mouse (Mus setulosus) 4 PCR positive None CAR Not reported
Praomys spp. 2 PCR positive None CAR Not reported
Greater forest shrew (Sylvisorex ollula) 1 PCR positive None CAR not reported
Primates (Formenty et al., 1999; Leroy
et al., 2004a; Rouquet et al., 2005;
Wittmann et al., 2007;
Reed et al., 2014)
Western gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) Not estimated Population declines
up to 98%
Gabon/ROC 1994–1996
Not estimated Population declines
up to 98%
Gabon/ROC 2000–2006
10 (80) (no outbreak) ROC 2005–2007
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3.1.1.3. Article 7(a)(iii) The zoonotic character of the disease
Presence
Parameter 1– Report of zoonotic human cases (anywhere)
Zoonotic human infections have been reported in several African countries (Pigott et al., 2014;
CDC, online-f). In most cases, the zoonotic origin of infection is still unknown.
Infections have been reported in Democratic Republic of Congo in 1972, 1976, 1977, 1995, 2007,
2008, 2012 and 2014. In 2007, the index case was a child who had presumably been infected through
the sweat of her asymptomatic father who had bought fruit bat meat at the local market (Leroy et al.,
2009); however, none of the numerous hunters who took part in the large annual mass hunting of the
bats were among the ﬁrst to succumb to the disease and it has been questioned if fruit bats were
indeed the origin of the outbreak (Leendertz et al., 2016). In 2014, the index case was a woman who
had been in contact with a non-human primates (NHP) carcass (unidentiﬁed species); however, no
samples were obtained for conﬁrmation of Ebola virus infection in the carcass (Maganga et al., 2014).
No source of infection was suspected in the other outbreaks.
All outbreaks in Gabon (1994, January and July 1996, 2001) and Republic of Congo (2001, 2002,
2003, 2005) were epidemiologically linked with infected gorillas, chimpanzees and duikers through
hunting or scavenging; the source of three of these outbreaks were also laboratory conﬁrmed
(Georges-Courbot et al., 1997b; Georges et al., 1999; Rouquet et al., 2005).
In Co^te d’Ivoire in 1994, one researcher was infected when performing a necropsy on an infected
chimpanzee carcass (Formenty et al., 1999).
In Sudan in 1976 and 1979, the outbreaks were epidemiologically linked to a cotton factory where
insectivorous bats were roosting; in the outbreak in 2004 no such link was suspected (WHO, 1978;
Baron et al., 1983).
In Guinea in 2013, the index case was a 2-year-old child who had likely been in direct or indirect
contact with a large colony of insectivorous bat (Mops condylurus) roosting in a hollow tree, however,
this link was not conﬁrmed (Marı Saez et al., 2015).
No infectious source could be identiﬁed in the outbreaks in Uganda in 2000, 2007, 2011 and May
and November 2012.
Serological surveys indicate that contacts with the virus outside outbreak times have occurred (Heymann
et al., 1980; Mathiot et al., 1989; Becquart et al., 2010; Schoepp et al., 2014; Mulangu et al., 2016).
3.1.1.4. Article 7(a)(iv) The resistance to treatments, including antimicrobial resistance
Parameter 1 – Resistant strain to any treatment even at laboratory level
No treatment is licensed for human or animal use (please see section below).
Species (references)
Seroprevalence
% (n samples)
Mortality Country
Time
period
Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) Not estimated Population declines
up to 98%
Gabon/ROC 1994–1966
Not estimated Ca. 25% Co^te d’Ivoire 1994
Not estimated Population declines
up to 98%
Gabon/ROC 2000–2006
Ungulates (Leroy et al., 2004a; Rouquet
et al., 2005)
Bay duiker (Cephalophus dorsalis) 1 PCR positive Not investigated Gabon/ROC 2000–2006
Other animals (Stansﬁeld et al., 1982;
Allela et al., 2005)
Dogs 31.8 (439) None Gabon 2001–2002
Guinea pigs 26 (138) None DRC 1979
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo; CAR: Central African Republic; ROC: Republic of Congo.
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3.1.1.5. Article 7(a)(v) The persistence of the disease in an animal population or the
environment
Animal population
Parameter 1 – Duration of infectious period in animals
Bats: Not known. Viral nucleic acid has been detected but the virus has not been isolated from wild
bats (Leroy et al., 2005; Pourrut et al., 2007, 2009; Hayman et al., 2010, 2012; Olival et al., 2013;
Ogawa et al., 2015). In one experimental study of the insectivorous bats species Mops condylurus and
Chaerephon pumilus and the fruit bat species Epomophorus wahlbergi, the virus was isolated in blood
and tissue up to 3 weeks post infection and in one of the infected fruit bats the virus was also isolated
once from faeces (Swanepoel et al., 1996) indicating that the infectious period in susceptible bat
species may be more than 3 weeks, although no natural shedding of Ebola has been detected (Kuhn,
2008; Olival and Hayman, 2014; Schoepp et al., 2014).
Non-human primates (NHP): The biological aspects of the disease process are similar in humans
and NHP and individuals are currently presumed infectious when clinical symptoms occur (Kuhn, 2008;
Olival and Hayman, 2014; Schoepp et al., 2014). Experimental infections show that death in NHPs
usually occur ca. 5–8 days post-infection but can occur up to 14 days after infection depending on
dose and species of virus (Geisbert et al., 2009; Nakayama and Saijo, 2013). Filoviruses could be
isolated up to 20 days after onset of infection from surviving NHPs (Fisher-Hoch et al., 1992).
One study reported ape carcasses remaining infectious in the rainforest for 3–4 days; another
determined the virus to remain viable up to 7 days in macaque carcasses (Leroy et al., 2004a; Prescott
et al., 2015).
The virus is not inactivated by freezing or refrigeration (Chepurnov et al., 1995; Piercy et al., 2010).
It is uncertain how long EV survives in carcasses and meat under different environmental conditions,
e.g. salting and drying (EFSA, 2014, 2015b).
Parameter 2 – Presence and duration of latent infection period
The occurrence of latent infection is not known in bats nor in chimpanzees and gorillas.
Parameter 3 – Presence and duration of the pathogen in healthy carriers
The infection is asymptomatic in bats. Studies of wild bats caught 5 months apart in a human
outbreak area showed rapid clearance of the infection (Leroy et al., 2005). The virus could be
recovered up to 3 weeks in experimentally infected, asymptomatic bats (Swanepoel et al., 1996).
Semen from men who survived the infection may remain infectious for 179 days or more after
onset of symptoms (Mate et al., 2015); such viral persistence may also occur in healthy great apes
(Leendertz et al., 2017). In one case, EV genetic material could be detected after 565 days but the
test could not tell if live virus was present and capable of spreading disease (Soka et al., 2016).
Environment
Parameter 4 – Length of survival (dpi) of the agent and/or detection of DNA in selected matrices (soil,
water, air) from the environment (scenarios: high and low T)
Data exist only from experiments which are usually mimicking hospital settings and are not based
on observations in nature.
Table 2: Ebola-virus survival in the environment
Environment Survival Temp. (°C)
Rel. humidity
(%)
Additional
conditions
Ref.
Blood Up to 14 days 21 or 27 40 or 80 – (Fischer et al., 2015)
Drying blood Up to 5 days 21 40 – (Fischer et al., 2015)
Drying blood Up to 5 days 27 80 – (Fischer et al., 2015)
Serum Up to 46 days 4 or 24 50–55 – (Wittmann et al., 2007)
Semen At least 8 days 27 80 – (Fischer et al., 2016b)
Dried semen Up to 4 days 27 80 – (Fischer et al., 2016b)
On solid surface Up to 6 days 21 40 In darkness (Sagripanti et al., 2010)
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3.1.1.6. Article 7(a)(vi) The routes and speed of transmission of the disease between
animals, and, when relevant, between animals and humans
Routes of transmission
Parameter 1 – Types of routes of transmission from animal to animal (horizontal, vertical)
Transmission chains and routes are not known for most animals.
NHP-to-NHP transmission: Horizontal transmission. Direct contact, conjunctival and oral contact
with infected individuals, carcasses and body ﬂuids (Feldmann and Geisbert, 2011; Mire et al., 2016).
Transmission via sexual contact with surviving males is theoretically possible as this route has been
identiﬁed in humans (Mate et al., 2015). It is not known how the infection enters into the NHP
population (Leendertz et al., 2017).
Bat-to-bat transmission: Such transmission is not conﬁrmed. Virus has not been isolated from wild
bats and virus shedding in wild bats has not been detected (Leroy et al., 2005; Pourrut et al., 2007,
2009; Hayman et al., 2010, 2012; Olival et al., 2013; Olival and Hayman, 2014; Ogawa et al., 2015).
Experimentally infected bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) did not infect other in-contact bats of the same
species (Paweska et al., 2016).
Aerosol transmission in laboratory settings:
Experimental aerosol infection documented in NHP, pigs, mice, and guinea pigs (Johnson et al., 1995;
Kobinger et al., 2011; Reed et al., 2011; Weingartl et al., 2012; Zumbrun et al., 2012a,b; Twenhafel
et al., 2013, 2015; Smither et al., 2015).
Aerosol transmission reported from guinea pigs to guinea pigs, pigs to pigs, pigs to NHP and from
NHP to NHP (Dedkova, 1993; Jaax et al., 1995; Kobinger et al., 2011; Weingartl et al., 2012; Wong
et al., 2015).
In these experiments, the animals were housed close together and droplet infection cannot be
excluded. Filoviruses have very little or no capacity to be airborne, i.e. no inhalation of infectious
particles takes place at a distance from the source. Transmission by air is not similar to inﬂuenza or
other airborne infection and the virus does not transmit from an infected person to a susceptible
person that is located at a distance (Mekibib and Ari€en, 2016).
Parameter 2 – Types of routes of transmission between animals and humans (direct, indirect, including
food-borne)
Direct contact via hunting, scavenging or butchering of infected NHP or other infected wildlife.
There is epidemiological evidence of such transmission in the human outbreaks in Gabon and Republic
of Congo in 1994 and 1996 and 2000–2005; three outbreaks were also laboratory conﬁrmed by
isolation of virus in carcasses from gorillas, chimpanzees and duiker (Georges et al., 1999; Rouquet
et al., 2005; Nkoghe et al., 2011). The risk factor for infection was related to the activities of hunting
and handling the carcasses, not to the consumption of meat. Virus is killed by heating for 60 min at
60°C or boiling for 5 min (CDC, online-d).
Environment Survival Temp. (°C)
Rel. humidity
(%)
Additional
conditions
Ref.
Dried on solid surface Up to 14 days 21 40 – (Fischer et al., 2015)
In tissue culture media,
dried on solid surface
Up to 50 days 4 50–55 On glass,
in darkness
(Wittmann et al., 2007)
In tissue culture media,
dried on solid surface
At least 26 days 4 50–55 On plastic,
in darkness
(Wittmann et al., 2007)
Water Up to 6 days 21 – – (Fischer et al., 2015)
Water Up to 3 days 27 – – (Fischer et al., 2015)
Domestic wastewater At least 8 days – – (Bibby et al., 2015)
Air (laboratory
generated aerosol)
180 minutes 18–22 80 – (Fischer et al., 2016a)
Air (laboratory
generated aerosol)
90 minutes 19–25 50–55 – (Piercy et al., 2010;
Smither et al., 2011)
Viruses with structural lipids (e.g. Ebola) survive best in dry air with a relative humidity less than 50–70% (Cox, 1995).
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Direct contact with bats or bat meat have been suspected, but not conﬁrmed, to be the source of
infection see Section 3.1.1.3.
Speed of transmission
Parameter 3 – Incidence between animals and, when relevant, between animals and humans
Measures of speed of transmission between animals or between animals and humans are not
known.
Parameter 4 – Transmission rate (beta) (from R0 and infectious period) between animals and, when
relevant, between animals and humans
The transmission rate is not known. Due to the physiological and sociable similarities between great
apes and humans, the transmission rate could be comparable to what has been observed in humans:
In the human outbreak in West Africa in 2013–2016, the range of estimated mean value of the basic
R0 and transmission rate (for the outbreak in general and for the three main countries individually)
were 1.55–2.73 and 0.20–0.45 per day, respectively (Althaus, 2014; Ahmad et al., 2016). Previous
estimates of R0 in other outbreaks have ranged between 1.33 and 2.7 (Chowell and Nishiura, 2014).
Great apes are highly sociable and larger outbreaks have been observed in these species (Caillaud
et al., 2006; Leendertz et al., 2017).
3.1.1.7 Article 7(a)(vii) The absence or presence and distribution of the disease in the
Union, and, where the disease is not present in the Union, the risk of its
introduction into the Union
Presence and distribution
Parameter 1 – Map where the disease is present in EU
The disease is not present in the EU; limited to the tropical belt of Africa (Pigott et al., 2014; WHO,
online-f).
Parameter 2 – Type of epidemiological occurrence (sporadic, epidemic, endemic) at MS level
Sporadic cases are reported in humans who have travelled, or who have been medically rescued,
from West Africa during the 2013–2016 outbreaks (ECDC, online-e).
Risk of introduction
Parameter 3 – Routes of possible introduction
• Infected humans travelling from outbreak areas (ECDC, online-e).
• Import of contaminated bushmeat from Africa, although no cases have yet been reported out
of the primary outbreaks locations due to the consumption of imported bushmeat (EFSA, 2014,
2015b). Bushmeat is meat from wild animals (endangered or not) native to Africa (Swamy and
Pinedo-Vasquez, 2014; BCTF, online).
• Import of infected NHP (Rollin et al., 1999).
• Food other than bushmeat has never been identiﬁed as associated with human cases in any of
the reported outbreaks. Other food products such as fruits and vegetables are unlikely routes
of introduction (EFSA, 2014, 2015b).
Parameter 4 – Number of animal moving and/or shipment size
Illegal imports of bushmeat do exist: examples of bushmeat amounts reported in personal luggage
at airports include (but not a complete list):
• France, Charles de Gaulle airport: 273 tonnes per year, mainly from Central Africa. Average
consignments of bushmeat were over 20 kg (Chaber et al., 2010).
• Switzerland: 249 kg/year, mainly from West Africa. Medium weight of consignments was 4.5 kg
(Falk et al., 2013).
• Austria: in 8 months bushmeat was conﬁscated six times (Schoder et al., 2015).
Nevertheless, the quantities mentioned above are just examples and they are not representative of
the real imported amounts, which are likely to be much higher, though impossible to quantify with
more accuracy. Furthermore, it should be considered that not all bushmeat is from animals susceptible
to EV and contaminated by the virus.
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Parameter 5 – Duration of infectious period in animal and/or commodity
Please see Section 3.1.1.5 Parameter 1. Carcasses of NHP have been documented to remain
infectious up to 7 days after death (Prescott et al., 2015). Infectious period in wild bats is not known;
in experimental infections, the virus could be recovered after 3 weeks (Swanepoel et al., 1996).
The virus viability is prolonged by freezing or refrigeration (Chepurnov et al., 1995; Piercy et al.,
2010; Reed et al., 2011). Please, see also Section 3.1.1.5 Parameter 4. It is uncertain how long EV
survives in carcasses and meat under different treatments, e.g. salting, smoking and drying which is
commonly done with bushmeat (EFSA, 2014, 2015b).
Parameter 6 – List of control measures at border (testing, quarantine, etc.)
• Human travel and border health measures (ECDC, online-c);
• Personal luggage control for imported bushmeat (Commission Regulation (EC) No 206/20091);
• Control of air and sea freight;
• Illegally imported live animals: quarantine and testing and/or euthanasia;
• Public information on risk of importing bushmeat (CDC, online-g).
Parameter 7 – Presence and duration of latent infection and/or carrier status
See Section 3.1.1.5.
Parameter 8 – Risk of introduction by possible entry routes (considering parameters from 3 to 7)
It is difﬁcult to provide a ﬁgure or a range of values of the overall risk of introduction of Ebola
through the different routes because a number of factors necessary for such estimation are not known
and some parameters might not be possible to estimate. The risk and uncertainties in estimating such
risk of introduction through the different routes are described in general terms below.
Humans travelling from outbreak areas
Such introduction has already been proven possible several times. A medically evacuated patient
entering a well prepared health care setting carries less risk of introduction to the general public than
a person who is unaware that he/she is infected when leaving the outbreak area. Clearly, the larger
outbreak and the more travellers from the area the higher risk of introduction.
Import of bush meat
The outcome of the assessment is the probability for at least a single case of human infected by
Ebola virus in Europe due to transmission via handling and preparation (carried out by consumers or
staff handling the food in kitchens immediately prior to consumption) and consumption of bush meat
illegally is imported from infected areas. This probability is the result of a combination of several
necessary steps: (1) the bush meat has to be contaminated with Ebola virus at the point of origin;
(2) the bush meat has to be (illegally) introduced into the EU; (3) the imported bush meat needs to
contain viable virus when it reaches the person; (4) the person has to be exposed to the virus; and (5)
the person needs to get infected following exposure.
Due to lack of data and knowledge, which results in very high uncertainty, it is not possible to
estimate that risk. However, considering all the elements in these steps, and based on: (i) the limited
number of outbreaks that have been reported to date in spite of the routine consumption of bush
meat in that continent, (ii) the handling of bush meat in Europe not involving high risk practices such
as hunting and butchering, and (iii) the assumed low overall consumption of bush meat in Europe, it
can be assumed that the potential for introduction and transmission of Ebola virus via bush meat in
Europe is currently low. It should be noted that the public health consequences of such an event
(a single human case of Ebola virus occurring in Europe) would be very serious given the high lethality
and potential for secondary transmission. In addition, it should be noted that the information
considered in this opinion is largely based on historic Ebola outbreaks and not speciﬁcally the recent
wide outbreak in West Africa (EFSA, 2014).
1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 206/2009 of 5 March 2009 on the introduction into the Community of personal consignments
of products of animal origin and amending Regulation (EC) No 136/2004. OJ L 77, 24.3.2009, p. 1–19.
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Import of non-human primates
Export quarantine lasting longer than the virus incubation time should in theory ensure that
infected animals are not exported, unless the animals could come in contact with the virus during the
stay in the export quarantine. Imported primates are not exposed directly to the general public;
avoidance of infection of personnel at import quarantine stations relies on training and infection
prevention. The route of infection to animal care workers has been demonstrated when Ebola Reston
virus was introduced into primate quarantine station in the USA from infected primates coming from
Philippines.
Food other than bush meat
In this assessment, ‘top-down’ (e.g. surveillance-based) and ‘bottom-up’ (e.g. using the standard
microbial risk assessment paradigm, where the agent is followed through the food chain to produce a
prediction of risk to human health relative to other agents and/or foods) approaches were combined.
Using the ‘top-down’ approach, it was concluded that food other than bush meat has never been
associated with human cases in any of the reported outbreaks. There is no evidence for food-borne
transmission of Ebola virus to persons in the EU.
Using the ‘bottom-up’ approach, it was concluded that the necessary sequence of events in the risk
pathway involves many hurdles: (1) the raw food to be exported has to be contaminated with Ebola
virus at the point of origin; (2) the imported food needs to contain viable virus at sufﬁcient load to
cause human infection when it arrives in the EU; (3) the person has to be exposed to the virus
through the handling and preparation (both carried out by consumers or staff handling the food in
kitchens immediately prior to consumption) as well as consumption of contaminated food; and (4) the
person needs to get infected following exposure. Each of these steps is necessary in order for a case
of disease to occur and none have been documented to happen in practice. Due to lack of data and
knowledge, which results in very high uncertainty, it is not possible to quantify the risk of food-borne
transmission of Ebola virus derived from the consumption of these imported foods, or in fact whether
or not this mode of transmission could occur at all.
The overall conclusions of both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches are consistent and suggest
that the risk of food-borne transmission of Ebola virus via food other than bush meat imported into the
EU remains a theoretical possibility only and has never been demonstrated in practice. However, the
uncertainty in the combined assessment is considered high given the lack of data (EFSA, 2015b).
3.1.1.8. Article 7(a)(viii) The existence of diagnostic and disease control tools
Diagnostic tools
Parameter 1 – Existence of diagnostic tools
• Direct detection of pathogen: polymerase chain reaction (PCR), antigen-capture enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA), immunohistochemistry testing
• Virus isolation
• Detection of antibodies: ELISAs (IgM and IgG) (see Table 3 for test performance)
Control tools
Parameter 2 – Existence of control tools
In Europe:
• Isolation of human cases
• Contact tracing (ECDC, online-b)
• Disinfection of contaminated areas with 0.5% sodium hypochlorite as recommended by WHO
(online-c).
• Incineration of imported bushmeat (CDC, online-a).
• Euthanasia of infected animals imported from Africa.
There are no licensed treatments or vaccines, however several are in human clinical trials (please
see below).
In outbreak areas, safe burial practice (see Section 3.1.5.2) and avoidance of bushmeat are also
recommended.
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3.1.2. Article 7(b) The impact of diseases
3.1.2.1. Article 7(b)(i) The impact of the disease on agricultural and aquaculture
production and other parts of the economy
The level of presence of the disease in the Union
Parameter 1 – Number of MSs where the disease is present
The disease is not present.
The loss of production due to the disease
Parameter 2 – Proportion of production losses (%) by epidemic/endemic situation
This is not applicable. The disease is of human health concern.
3.1.2.2. Article 7(b)(ii) The impact of the disease on human health
Transmissibility between animals and humans
Parameter 1 – Types of routes of transmission between animals and humans
Contact with infected animals, carcasses, meat and body ﬂuids from infected wildlife. So far, the
virus has been isolated from carcasses of chimpanzees, gorillas and duikers however infection is likely
to occur in additional species (Leroy et al., 2004a; Rouquet et al., 2005; Lahm et al., 2007; Olivero
et al., 2017).
The risk of infection from bat meat is unknown.
The reservoir host is not determined hence additional infective sources and infection routes may
exist.
Parameter 2 – Incidence of zoonotic cases
Since 1972, 26 cases of zoonotic transmission are known to have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Pigott et al., 2014; WHO, online-f). The population of Sub-Saharan Africa is 856 million people (WB,
online).
Transmissibility between humans
Parameter 3 – Human-to-human transmission is sufﬁcient to sustain sporadic cases or community-level
outbreak
Human-to-human transmission occurred in all but four of the known zoonotic transmissions. Before
the epidemic in West Africa in 2013–2016, where the number of recorded cases was 28.600, outbreaks
included up to 425 people maximum (CDC, online-f).
Parameter 4 – Sporadic, endemic, epidemic, or pandemic potential
The disease occurs sporadically in Africa. The disease was, however, widespread in Guinea, Liberia
and Sierra Leone in the 2013–2016 epidemics and the infection was imported into several countries
(Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, the USA, Spain, Italy, France, Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom,
Norway) through infected medical personnel and international travels. In Nigeria, the infection spread
to 19 people (WHO, online-a). The WHO declared the Ebola epidemic to be a Public Health Emergency
of International Concern in August 2014 (WHO, online-b).
The severity of human forms of the disease
Parameter 5 – Disability-adjusted life year (DALY)
DALY has not been calculated. Ebola virus disease ﬁrst entered the Global Disease Burden list in 2015
in the group of ‘Neglected tropical diseases and Malaria’ (Global Burden of Disease 2015 Mortality and
Causes of Death Collaborators, online). The years of lives lost (YLL) due to Ebola for that year was
estimated to be 5.500. In total, 11,300 people were recorded to have died between December 2013–April
2016, mainly in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia (CDC, online-f). The population of these three countries
combined is 22.5 million people (WB, online).
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Up until 2013, the overall number of recorded deaths in Sub-Saharan African countries since the
disease was detected in 1976 was ca. 1,500 (CDC, online-f). The population of sub-Saharan Africa is
856 million people (WB, online).
The availability of effective prevention or medical treatment in humans
Parameter 6 – Availability of medical treatment and their effectiveness (therapeutic effect and any
resistance)
No Ebola speciﬁc medical treatment is licensed. Experimental treatments are in clinical trials (see
below). Treatment relies on supportive care. WHO recommends use of convalescent blood products
(WHO, online-d).
Parameter 7 – Availability of vaccines and their effectiveness (reduced morbidity)
So far, no vaccine is licensed. Several vaccine candidates are in clinical trials (see below). Only one
has been tested for efﬁcacy in humans; the rVSV-EBOV vaccine candidate protected 100% of the
4,123 vaccinated in-contact people in a ring-vaccination trial during the 2013–2016 epidemic (Henao-
Restrepo et al., 2017).
3.1.2.3. Article 7(b)(iii) The impact of the disease on animal welfare
Parameter 1 – Severity of clinical signs at case level and related level and duration of impairment
NHP develop haemorrhagic fever with severe clinical signs similar to humans (Kuhn, 2008;
Leendertz et al., 2017). Experimental infections show that deaths in NHPs usually occur ca. 5–8 days
post-infection but up to 14 days have been recorded depending on dose and species of virus (Geisbert
et al., 2009; Nakayama and Saijo, 2013).
3.1.2.4. Article 7(b)(iv) The impact of the disease on biodiversity and the environment
Biodiversity
Parameter 1 – Endangered wild species affected: listed species as in CITES and/or IUCN list
CITES (online)
• Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes); Appendix I
• Western gorilla (Gorilla gorilla); Appendix I
IUCN list (IUCN, online)
• Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) - Endangered
• Western gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) - Critically endangered (upgraded to critically endangered in
2007 due to EV disease)
Parameter 2 – Mortality in wild species
Ebola infection is not detected in wildlife in EU.
In Africa, large outbreaks in great apes (e.g. chimpanzees and gorillas) have led to population
declines of 98% in some places and the disease is of concern for the survival of these endangered
species (Leendertz et al., 2017). Observed mortality in other wildlife during human outbreaks indicate
that additional species might be susceptible, e.g. mandrills (Mandrillus sp.), guenon (Cercopithecus sp.)
and other NHP, as well as forest antelopes (Cephalophus sp.), bush pigs (Potamochoerus porcus),
brush-tailed porcupines (Atherurus africanus) and other animals (Lahm et al., 2007; Olson et al.,
2012). The infection is asymptomatic in bats (Swanepoel et al., 1996; Leroy et al., 2005).
Environment
Parameter 3 – Capacity of the pathogen to persist in the environment and cause mortality in wildlife
The reservoir and/or environment maintaining the virus between recorded outbreaks is not known;
central drivers involved in virus spillover are wildlife hunting, deforestation/forest fragmentation, and
demographic changes of wildlife (Feldmann and Geisbert, 2011; EFSA, 2015a; Leendertz, 2016).
For stability of the virus outside hosts, please see Section 3.1.1.5 Parameter 4.
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3.1.3. Article 7(c) Its potential to generate a crisis situation and its potential use
in bioterrorism
Parameter 1 – Listed in OIE/CFSPH classiﬁcation of pathogens
It is not listed (OIE, online-b).
Parameter 2 – Listed in the Encyclopaedia of Bioterrorism Defence of Australia Group
It is listed (Berger, 2005).
Parameter 3 – Included in any other list of potential bio- agro-terrorism agents
It is listed, including:
• WHO: Category A priority agent (WHO, online-i)
• CDC: Category A Bioterrorism Agent (CDC, online-c)
• US Department of Health and Human Services: Select Agent, Tier 1 agent (HHS, online)
• National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases: Priority pathogen, Category A (NIAID,
online)
3.1.4. Article 7(d) The feasibility, availability and effectiveness of the following
disease prevention and control measures
3.1.4.1. Article 7(d)(i) Diagnostic tools and capacities
Diagnostic tests that have been approved for Emergency Use Assessment and Listing procedure by
WHO are shown in Table 3, with an indication of the test performance and the matrix sample to be
used. The positive and negative predictive values can only be estimated using data from a cross-
sectional study or other population-based study in which valid prevalence estimated can be obtained.
No OIE certiﬁed diagnostic tool exists (OIE, online-a).
Table 3: Diagnostic tests for Ebola approved for Emergency Use Assessment and Listing procedure
by WHO (WHO, online-g)
Name Type of test Matrix
Sensitivity*
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity*
(95% CI)
OraQuick® Ebola
Rapid Antigen Test
Kit
Immunoassay for detection
of Ebola (EBOV) antigen
Cadaveric oral
ﬂuid, blood
94.1% (83.8–98.8) 100% (98.1–100.0)
SD Q Line Ebola
Zaire Ag
Immunoassay for detection
of Ebola (EBOV) antigen
Blood, plasma,
serum
84.9% (78.6–91.2) 99.7% (99.1–100.0)
Antigen Rapid Test
Kit, ReEBOVTM
Immunoassay for detection
of Ebola (EBOV) antigen
Blood, plasma,
serum
91.8% (84.5–96.8) 99.7% (99.1–100.0)
RealStar® Filovirus
Screen RT-PCR Kit
1.0
RT-PCR for detection of
Ebola RNA (EBOV, SUDV,
TAFV, BDBV)
Plasma Performance
acceptable**
–
LiferiverTM Ebola
Virus (EBOV) Real
Time RT-PCR Kit
RT- PCR for detection of
Ebola RNA (EBOV, SUDV,
TAFV, BDBV)
Blood, serum,
plasma
Performance
acceptable**
–
Xpert® Ebola Test RT-PCR for detection of
Ebola RNA (EBOV)
Blood Performance
acceptable***
–
FilmArrayTM
Biothreat-E
RT-PCR for detection of
Ebola RNA (EBOV)
Blood, urine Performance
acceptable***
–
EBOV: Ebola virus (Zaire); SUDV: Sudan ebolavirus; TAFV: Tai Forest ebolavirus; BDBV: Bundibugyo ebolavirus; RT-PCR: reverse
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction; RNA: ribonucleic acid.
*: Sensitivity and speciﬁcity as reported by WHO public reports (WHO (online-g).
**: Safety and performance documentation was reviewed by WHO and external experts.
***: The analytical evaluation of the tests was conducted at the Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine in Hamburg,
Germany, which is a WHO Collaborating Centre for Arbovirus and Haemorrhagic Fever Reference and Research.
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3.1.4.2. Article 7(d)(ii) Vaccination
No vaccine is licensed. Table 4 shows vaccine candidates that are in the most advanced stages of
clinical trials, and their effectiveness tested so far. Additional candidates are under development and
evaluation (Martins et al., 2016; ECDC, online-d).
Only one vaccine candidate has been tested for efﬁcacy in humans; the rVSV-EBOV vaccine candidate
protected 100% of the 4,123 vaccinated people in a ring-vaccination trial during the 2013–2016 epidemic
(WHO, online-d). Duration of protection in humans not known for any candidate. Limited data on
duration of protection in animal models; up to 18 months in rodent model (rVSV-ZEBOV) has been
documented (Wong et al., 2015).
3.1.4.3. Article 7(d)(iii) Medical treatments
Availability
Parameter 1 – Types of drugs available on the market
No Ebola speciﬁc treatment is licensed. Table 5 shows experimental treatment candidates that are
in the most advanced stages of clinical trials. Additional treatment candidates are under development
and evaluation (ECDC, online-d; WHO, online-e). The antiviral drug favipiravir in Table 5 is licensed for
human use against inﬂuenza in Japan (Furuta et al., 2013). Convalescent blood/plasma is currently the
priority treatment option of WHO based on empirical evidence (WHO, online-d). The use of whole
blood or plasma from survivors does not require an EU authorisation and is the responsibility of
National Competent Authorities for Blood and Blood Components (ECDC, online-a).
Table 4: Most advanced vaccine candidates against EV disease (ECDC, online-d; OIE, online-a)
Vaccine candidate
Clinical
trial
status
Type of
vaccine
Administration
route
Booster/
pairing
required
Effectiveness*
rVSV-ZEBOV (Geisbert and
Feldmann, 2011; Wong et al., 2014;
Huttner et al., 2015; Agnandji
et al., 2016; Marzi et al., 2016;
Henao-Restrepo et al., 2017;
Regules et al., 2017)
Phase III Virus-vectored,
live, replicating
IM** No 100%***
Ad26.ZEBOV (Milligan et al., 2016) Phase III Virus-vectored,
live, non-
replicating
IM Yes –
ChAd3-Ebo (Stanley et al., 2014;
De Santis et al., 2016; Ewer et al.,
2016; Tapia et al., 2016)
Phase II Virus-vectored,
live, non-
replicating
IM Yes –
Ad5-EBOV (Zhu et al., 2017) Phase II Virus-vectored,
live, non-
replicating
IM Yes –
MVA-BN-Filo(Ewer et al., 2016;
Tapia et al., 2016)
Phase III Virus-vectored,
live, non-
replicating
IM Yes –
IM: Intramuscular injection.
*: One human study only. All candidates in clinical trials are protective in NHP studies.
**: Mucosal (oral or intranasal) in mouse and macaque model (Qiu et al., 2009).
***: 4123 contact people in outbreak vaccinated.
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Parameter 2 – Availability/production capacity (per year)
Existing supplies of most experimental medicines are limited.
European Blood Alliance coordinates the European stocks convalescence blood products from
survivors in the EU/EEA (EBA, online).
Ca. 10,000 treatment doses of favipiravir are available (WHO, online-e).
Ca. 150 treatment doses of ZMapp are available (WHO, online-e).
Effectiveness
Parameter 3 – Therapeutic effects on the ﬁeld (effectiveness)
See Table 5.
Efﬁcacy in humans is not determined for any treatment. Despite perceived success in the few
treated on compassionate grounds, their efﬁcacy determination remains elusive due to other
interventions (WHO, online-e).
Preliminary studies of favipiravir showed that this drug may increase survival rate and reduce viral
load in EVD patients (Bai et al., 2016; Sissoko et al., 2016). In a retrospective clinical case series that
was performed for PCR-conﬁrmed EVD-patients in a hospital in Sierra Leone, 56.4% (22/39) of
EVD-patients treated with WHO-recommended therapy plus favipiravir recovered in comparison with
35.3% (30/85) of the control EVD-patients that were treated with WHO-recommended therapy only,
52.9% of patients who received favipiravir had a > 100-fold viral load reduction, compared with only
16.7% of patients in the control group (Bai et al., 2016).
Feasibility
Parameter 4 – Way of administration
See Table 5.
3.1.4.4. Article 7(d)(iv) Biosecurity measures
Parameter 1 – Available biosecurity measures
• Regular updates on the availability of licensed vaccines and treatments: this is likely to change
rapidly (see section on vaccines and treatments) (Borio et al., 2002; Bray, 2003; Sprenger and
Coulombier, 2014; Cenciarelli et al., 2015);
• Prevention of access to virus stocks: Reduce possibilities for theft of virus from laboratories or
during outbreaks;
• Security at airports and other high risk places for bioterrorism attacks;
• Quarantine and biosafety routines at centres and veterinary inspection posts for non-human
primates imported;
• Improved means of detection of deliberately induced disease outbreaks: recognition of an
unusually large number of similar cases of severe illness over a short period of time, rapid
medical recognition and rapid laboratory conﬁrmation;
Table 5: Most advanced treatment candidates (Mendoza et al., 2016; ECDC, online-d); NIH, online;
WHO, online-e)
Name
Clinical
trial status
Type of
treatment
Administration
route
Notes
CP/CBP (WHO, online-d) Phase II/III Convalescent
plasma/blood
IV
Favipiravir (Bai et al., 2016) Phase II Antiviral drug PO Licensed for human use
against Inﬂuenza in Japan.
Zmapp (McCarthy, 2014;
Qiu et al., 2014)
Phase II Monoclonal
antibodies
IV MIL-77 is a similar product
rVSV-EBOV (Marzi et al., 2011,
2016)
Phase III Virus-vectored
vaccine
IM* Vaccine has potential for
post-exposure treatment
BCX4430 (Taylor et al., 2016) Phase I Antiviral drug IM
*: Mucosal (oral or intranasal) in mouse and macaque model (Qiu et al., 2009).
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• Prevention of person-to-person transmission: isolation and health care facilities, personal
protection and reliable decontamination procedures;
• Contact-tracing: rapid identiﬁcation and follow-up of possibly infected people.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of biosecurity measures in preventing the pathogen introduction
Vaccination: Should efﬁcient vaccines become available, they could prevent introduction of the
pathogen in high-risk populations such as airport security personnel, veterinarians and animal handlers at
primate importation centres, and health care employees. However, the unpredictable introduction routes
of terrorist attacks make it difﬁcult to identify all possible target populations for vaccination programmes.
Virus theft prevention: High level security and personnel control in laboratories reduce the likelihood
of theft. Virus could however have been acquired by terrorist groups in the past. Acquisition of virus
from infected patients or animals during outbreaks is possible.
Airport security: Unsuspicious material and possibly small volume of virus containing substance
could be difﬁcult to detect. Non-travellers can also enter airports.
Quarantine and biosafety routines at non-human primates import centres: Provided high-quality
standards and routines this should be efﬁcient to prevent virus introduction.
Other measures are not likely to be effective in preventing pathogen introduction (Borio et al.,
2002; Bray, 2003; Sprenger and Coulombier, 2014; Cenciarelli et al., 2015).
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of biosecurity measure
• Vaccination and treatments: Should vaccines and/or treatments become available, vaccination
is feasible.
• Prevention of access to virus stocks is unfeasible due to the possible existence of unregistered
virus stocks and access to infectious material in outbreaks.
• Security: broadening security measures to include screening of travellers for potentially infectious
biological material is theoretically feasible; however, it is unfeasible to control all airport visitors.
• Prevention of virus introduction at NHP import centres is feasible provided high-quality
quarantine and biosafety standards.
• Improved means of detection of deliberately induced disease outbreaks: Feasible. It requires
preparedness plans and available material.
• Prevention of person-to-person transmission: Feasible. It requires preparedness plans and
available material.
• Contact tracing: Feasible. It requires preparedness and available material. A SMS system for
follow up persons can be used (Tracey et al., 2015).
3.1.4.5. Article 7(d)(v) Restrictions on the movement of animals and products
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available movement restriction measures
Avoid import of NHP from Africa.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of restriction of animal movement in preventing the between-farm spread
This is not applicable. Restriction of farm animal movement in the EU is not indicated.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of restriction of animal movement
Avoidance of import of non-human primates from Africa is feasible; several other supplying
countries exist (Hunsmann, 2003).
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3.1.4.6. Article 7(d)(vi) Killing of animals
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available methods for killing animals
Euthanasia of animals imported from Africa is available. There is no indication for killing EU animals.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of killing animals (at farm level or within the farm) for reducing/stopping
spread of the disease
This is not applicable. There is no indication for killing EU animals.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of killing animals
It is feasible to euthanise animals imported from Africa. There is no indication for killing EU animals.
3.1.4.7. Article 7(d)(vii) Disposal of carcasses and other relevant animal by-products
Availability
Parameter 1 – Available disposal option
Incineration of conﬁscated bushmeat (CDC, online-a,b).
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 – Effectiveness of disposal option
Appropriately incinerated material does not pose a health risk (CDC, online-a).
Feasibility
Parameter 3 – Feasibility of disposal option
It is feasible.
3.1.5. Article 7(e) The impact of disease prevention and control measures
3.1.5.1. Article 7(e)(i) The direct and indirect costs for the affected sectors and the
economy as a whole
Parameter 1 – Cost of control (e.g. treatment/vaccine, biosecurity)
Vaccines or treatments are under development; there is no data on the cost of disease prevention
and control measures.
Parameter 2 – Cost of eradication (culling, compensation)
Not applicable. Culling of farm animals in the EU is not indicated.
Parameter 3 – Cost of surveillance and monitoring
There is no data on the cost of surveillance and monitoring.
Parameter 4 – Trade loss (bans, embargoes, sanctions) by animal product
There are no costs because no restriction of EU animals or animal products is indicated.
Parameter 5 – Importance of the disease for the affected sector (% loss or € lost compared to
business amount of the sector)
Not applicable for farm animals. Losses and costs are associated with the prevention and effect of
human disease and deaths.
3.1.5.2. Article 7(e)(ii) The societal acceptance of disease prevention and control measures
Due to cultural issues, there were social resistance to Ebola control measures (for example, safe
burial including avoiding washing and touching the dead body (WHO, online-h) in West Africa
(Fairhead, online). Such resistance is unlikely to occur in the EU.
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For imported great apes, quarantine and biosafety measures are suggested. Euthanasia should be
considered, if the animal is positive. Considering the severity of the symptoms it might be the most
action to take in line with animal welfare, although considering these are endangered species of great
apes, this may be a sensitive issue.
3.1.5.3. Article 7(e)(iii) The welfare of affected subpopulations of kept and wild animals
Parameter 1 – Welfare impact of control measures on domestic animals
No control measures in domestic animals are indicated.
Parameter 2 – Wildlife depopulation as control measure
No control measures in European wildlife are indicated.
3.1.5.4. Article 7(e)(iv) The environment and biodiversity
Environment
Parameter 1 – Use and potential residuals of biocides or medical drugs in environmental compartments
(soil, water, feed, manure)
Sodium chlorite, recommended disinfection agent by WHO (Cook et al., 2015; WHO, online-c) is
widely used in industrial cleaning and in private households. Due to its high reactivity and instability, it
rapidly disappears in the environment. Sodium hydrochlorite is toxic to aquatic animals; it is however
rapidly inactivated in organic matter such as in wastewater and sewage. The role of hypochlorite
pollution is assumed as negligible. No secondary poisoning has been considered, hypochlorite not
being transferred in the trophic chain (ECHA, online).
Biodiversity
Parameter 2 – Mortality in wild species
No control measures in European wildlife are indicated.
3.2. Assessment according to Article 5 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Article 5 of the AHL
about Ebola virus disease (Table 6). The expert judgement was based on Individual and Collective
Behavioural Aggregation (ICBA) approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology (EFSA
AHAW Panel, 2017). Experts have been provided with information of the disease fact-sheet mapped
into Article 5 criteria (see supporting information, Annex A), based on that the experts indicate their
Y/N or ‘na’ judgement on each criterion of Article 5, and the reasoning supporting their judgement.
The minimum number of judges in the judgement was ten. The expert judgement was conducted
as described in the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017). For details on the interpretation
of the questions, see Appendix B of the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
Table 6: Outcome of the expert judgement on the Article 5 criteria for Ebola virus disease
Criteria to be met by the disease:
According to AHL, a disease shall be included in the list referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 of
Article 5 if it has been assessed in accordance with Article 7 and meets all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
A(i) The disease is transmissible Y
A(ii) Animal species are either susceptible to the disease or vectors and reservoirs thereof
exist in the Union
Y
A(iii) The disease causes negative effects on animal health or poses a risk to public health due
to its zoonotic character
Y
A(iv) Diagnostic tools are available for the disease Y
A(v) Risk-mitigating measures and, where relevant, surveillance of the disease, are effective
and proportionate to the risks posed by the disease in the Union
Y
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3.2.1. Outcome of the assessment of Ebola virus disease according to criteria of
Article 5(3) of the AHL on its eligibility to be listed
As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article
5 if it fulﬁls all criteria of the ﬁrst set from A(i) to A(v) and at least one of the second set of criteria
from B(i) to B(v). According to the assessment methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), a criterion is
considered fulﬁlled when the outcome is ‘Yes’. According to the results shown in Table 6, Ebola virus
disease complies with all criteria of the ﬁrst set and with two criteria of the second set, therefore it is
considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article 5 of the AHL.
3.3. Assessment according to Article 9 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Annex IV referring to
categories as in Article 9 of the AHL about Ebola virus disease (Tables 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11). The expert
judgement was based on ICBA approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology. Experts
have been provided with information of the disease fact-sheet mapped into Article 9 criteria (see
supporting information, Annex A), based on that the experts indicate their Y/N or ‘na’ judgement on each
criterion of Article 9, and the reasoning supporting their judgement. The minimum number of judges in
the judgement was 10. The expert judgement was conducted as described in the methodological opinion
(EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017). For details on the interpretation of the questions, see Appendix B of the
methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point A(i)–A(v), the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
B(i) The disease causes or could cause signiﬁcant negative effects in the Union on animal
health, or poses or could pose a signiﬁcant risk to public health due to its zoonotic
character
Y
B(ii) The disease agent has developed resistance to treatments and poses a signiﬁcant danger
to public and/or animal health in the Union
na
B(iii) The disease causes or could cause a signiﬁcant negative economic impact affecting
agriculture or aquaculture production in the Union
N
B(iv) The disease has the potential to generate a crisis or the disease agent could be used for
the purpose of bioterrorism
Y
B(v) The disease has or could have a signiﬁcant negative impact on the environment,
including biodiversity, of the Union
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No), red = not applicable (na), i.e. insufﬁcient evidence or irrelevant to judge.
Table 7: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 1 of Annex IV
(category A of Article 9) for Ebola virus disease
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
1 The disease is not present in the territory of the Union OR present only in exceptional
cases (irregular introductions) OR present in only in a very limited part of the territory of
the Union
Y
2.1 The disease is highly transmissible NC
2.2 There be possibilities of airborne or waterborne or vector-borne spread NC
2.3 The disease affects multiple species of kept and wild animals OR single species of kept
animals of economic importance
NC
2.4 The disease may result in high morbidity and signiﬁcant mortality rates Y
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At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point 1–2.4, the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
3 The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant consequences on public health,
including epidemic or pandemic potential OR possible signiﬁcant threats to food safety
NC
4 The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
5(a) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
NC
5(b) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(c) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(d) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the protection
of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or long-term
damage to those species or breeds
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No), yellow = no consensus (NC).
Table 8: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 2 of Annex IV
(category B of Article 9) for Ebola virus disease
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
1 The disease is present in the whole OR part of the Union territory with an endemic
character AND (at the same time) several Member States or zones of the Union are free of
the disease
N
2.1 The disease is moderately to highly transmissible NC
2.2 There be possibilities of airborne or waterborne or vector-borne spread NC
2.3 The disease affects single or multiple species Y
2.4 The disease may result in high morbidity with in general low mortality N
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point 1–2.4, the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
3 The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant consequences on public health,
including epidemic potential OR possible signiﬁcant threats to food safety
Y
4 The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial
costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals
N
5(a) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour
markets
NC
5(b) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(c) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(d) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the protection
of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or long-term
damage to those species or breeds
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No), yellow = no consensus (NC).
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3.3.1. Non-consensus questions
This section displays the assessment related to each criterion of Annex IV referring to the
categories of Article 9 of the AHL where no consensus was achieved in form of tables (Tables 13, 14,
15, 16 and 17). The proportion of Y, N or `na0 answers are reported, followed by the list of different
supporting views for each answer.
Table 9: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 3 of Annex IV
(category C of Article 9) for Ebola virus disease
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
1 The disease is present in the whole OR part of the Union territory with an endemic
character
N
2.1 The disease is moderately to highly transmissible NC
2.2 The disease is transmitted mainly by direct or indirect transmission Y
2.3 The disease affects single or multiple species Y
2.4 The disease usually does not result in high morbidity and has negligible or no mortality
AND often the most observed effect of the disease is production loss
N
At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at point 1–2.4, the disease needs to fulﬁl at least one of the following
criteria
3 The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant consequences on public health, or
possible signiﬁcant threats to food safety
Y
4 The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of parts of the Union, mainly related
to its direct impact on certain types of animal production systems
N
5(a) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour markets NC
5(b) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on animal welfare, by causing suffering of large
numbers of animals
N
5(c) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on the environment, due to the direct impact of the
disease OR due to the measures taken to control it
N
5(d) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on a long-term effect on biodiversity or the protection
of endangered species or breeds, including the possible disappearance or long-term
damage to those species or breeds
N
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No), yellow = no consensus (NC).
Table 10: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 4 of Annex IV
(category D of Article 9) for Ebola virus disease
Criteria to be met by the disease:
The disease needs to fulﬁl all of the following criteria
Final
outcome
D The risk posed by the disease in question can be effectively and proportionately mitigated
by measures concerning movements of animals and products in order to prevent or limit its
occurrence and spread
Y
The disease fulﬁls criteria of section 1, 2, 3 or 5 of Annex IV of AHL Y
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No).
Table 11: Outcome of the expert judgement related to the criteria of section 5 of Annex IV
(category E of Article 9) for Ebola virus disease
Diseases in category E need to fulﬁl criteria of Sections 1, 2 or 3 of Annex IV of AHL
and/or the following:
Final
outcome
E Surveillance of the disease is necessary for reasons relating to animal health, animal welfare,
human health, the economy, society or the environment(If a disease fulﬁls the criteria as in
Article 5, thus being eligible to be listed, consequently category E would apply.)
Y
Colour code: green = consensus (Yes/No).
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Reasoning supporting the judgement
Supporting Yes for 2.1 (cat.A):
• The disease is highly transmissible in humans and thus potentially also in great apes.
Supporting Yes for 2.1 (cat.B,C):
• Based on R0 values reported in humans, the transmission is not high.
• Not all Ebola strains are highly transmissible.
Reasoning supporting the judgement
Supporting Yes:
• Experimental aerosol infection documented in NHP, pigs, mice, and guinea pigs.
• EV survival in water at 21 or 27°C can be for days, so the disease might be potentially
waterborne.
Supporting No:
• Direct contact with body ﬂuid is the main route of spread.
• According to ECDC, Ebola virus disease is not an airborne disease.
• Aerosol transmission has been demonstrated only in experimental conditions, while the major
route is direct transmission.
• Survival in water does not necessarily imply waterborne transmission of infection.
• Flaviviruses have very little or no capacity to be transmitted by the airborne route.
Supporting na:
• Transmission chains and routes are not known for most animals.
Reasoning supporting the judgement
Supporting Yes:
• Animals (NHPs) can be experimentally affected.
• Naturally susceptible species in the EU are present in zoos.
• Pigs can be experimentally infected and they may develop a respiratory form of the disease.
Table 14: Outcome of the expert judgement related to criterion 2.3 of Article 9
Question
Final
outcome
Response
Y (%) N (%) na (%)
2.3 (cat.A) The disease affects multiple species of kept and wild animals
OR single species of kept animals of economic importance
NC 80 20 0
NC: no consensus; number of judges: 10.
Table 12: Outcome of the expert judgement related to criterion 2.1 of Article 9
Question
Final
outcome
Response
Y (%) N (%) na (%)
2.1 (cat.A) The disease is highly transmissible NC 70 30 0
2.1 (cat.B,C) The disease is moderately to highly transmissible NC 30 70 0
NC: no consensus; number of judges: 10.
Table 13: Outcome of the expert judgement related to criterion 2.2 of Article 9
Question
Final
outcome
Response
Y (%) N (%) na (%)
2.2 (cat.A,B) There be possibilities of airborne or waterborne or
vector-borne spread
NC 30 20 50
NC: no consensus; number of judges: 10.
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Supporting No:
• No susceptible domestic or free-range wild animals are present in the EU.
Reasoning supporting the judgement
Supporting Yes:
• There may be pandemic potential in humans. It is not certain that biosecurity measures are
able to prevent a pandemic spread, e.g. if a large-scale epidemic is present among humans in
a country with a lot of exchanges with the rest of the world (aircraft travelling).
• There have been cases of widespread disease deeming the Ebola epidemic a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern in August 2014 (see Section 3.1.2.2).
Supporting No:
• The EV disease leads to potential signiﬁcant consequences to public health with epidemic
potential although without pandemic potential. According to the deﬁnition of a pandemic by
ECDC, ‘an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international
boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people’, the introduction of EV into EU
would not lead to such a big scale spread, but it would be rather contained due to
implementation of control and hygienic measures.
Reasoning supporting the judgement
Supporting Yes:
• In the 2013–2016 epidemic in Africa, the impact on labour markets was catastrophic.
• EV disease could have an impact on labour markets in the EU, but not related speciﬁcally to
agricultural production.
• The impact on society and labour markets would depend on the extent of epidemics in
humans. It may have potentially an impact on domestic species in the EU, but not currently.
Supporting No:
• No domestic species were affected during the outbreaks in Africa, further the possible role of
pigs (which are experimentally susceptible to Ebola) remains mostly unclear. Therefore, the
impact on labour market is not signiﬁcant due to its effect purely on domestic species.
Table 15: Outcome of the expert judgement related to criterion 3 of Article 9
Question
Final
outcome
Response
Y (%) N (%) na (%)
3 (cat.A) The disease has a zoonotic potential with signiﬁcant
consequences on public health, including epidemic or
pandemic potential OR possible signiﬁcant threats to
food safety
NC 70 30 0
NC: no consensus; number of judges: 10.
Table 16: Outcome of the expert judgement related to criterion 5(a) of Article 9
Question
Final
outcome
Response
Y (%) N (%) na (%)
5(a) The disease has a signiﬁcant impact on society, with in
particular an impact on labour markets
NC 30 70 0
NC: no consensus; number of judges: 10.
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3.3.2. Outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for Ebola virus disease
for the purpose of categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL
As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered ﬁtting in a certain category (A, B, C, D or E
corresponding to point (a) to point (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL) if it is eligible to be listed for Union
intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) and fulﬁls all criteria of the ﬁrst set from 1 to 2.4 and at least one
of the second set of criteria from 3 to 5(d) as shown in Tables 7–11. According to the assessment
methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), a criterion is considered fulﬁlled when the outcome is ‘Yes’.
A description of the outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for Ebola for the purpose of
categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL is presented in Table 17.
According to the assessment here performed, Ebola complies with the following criteria of the
sections 1–5 of Annex IV of the AHL for the application of the disease prevention and control rules
referred to in points (a) to (e) of Article 9(1):
1) To be assigned to category A, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the ﬁrst set (1,
2.1–2.4) and according to the assessment Ebola complies with criteria 1 and 2.4 and the
assessment was inconclusive on compliance with criteria 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. To be eligible for
category A, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set
(3, 4, 5a–d) and Ebola disease does not comply with criteria 4, 5b, 5c and 5d and the
assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criteria 3 and 5a.
2) To be assigned to category B, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the ﬁrst set
(1, 2.1–2.4) and according to the assessment Ebola disease complies with criterion 2.3, does
not comply with criteria 1 and 2.4 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with
criteria 2.1 and 2.2. To be eligible for category B, a disease needs to comply additionally with
one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a–d) and Ebola disease complies with criterion 3
and does not comply with criteria 4, 5b, 5c and 5d, and the assessment is inconclusive on
compliance with criterion 5a.
3) To be assigned to category C, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the ﬁrst set (1,
2.1–2.4) and according to the assessment Ebola disease complies with criteria 2.2 and 2.3,
does not comply with criteria 1 and 2.4 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance
with criterion 2.1. To be eligible for category B, a disease needs to comply additionally with
one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a–d) and Ebola complies with criterion 3, does
not comply with criteria 4, 5b, 5c and 5d the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with
criterion 5a.
4) To be assigned to category D, a disease needs to comply with criteria of section 1, 2, 3 or 5
of Annex IV of the AHL and with the speciﬁc criterion D of section 4, which Ebola disease
complies with.
5) To be assigned to category E, a disease needs to comply with criteria of section 1, 2 or 3 of
Annex IV of the AHL and/or the surveillance of the disease is necessary for reasons relating
Table 17: Outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for Ebola virus disease for the
purpose of categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL
Category
Article 9 criteria
1° set of criteria 2° set of criteria
1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3 4 5a 5b 5c 5d
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to animal health, animal welfare, human health, the economy, society or the environment.
The latter is applicable if a disease fulﬁls the criteria as in Article 5, which Ebola disease
complies with.
3.4. Assessment of Article 8
This section presents the results of the assessment on the criteria of Article 8(3) of the AHL about
Ebola virus disease. The Article 8(3) criteria are about animal species to be listed, as it reads below:
‘3. Animal species or groups of animal species shall be added to this list if they are affected or if
they pose a risk for the spread of a speciﬁc listed disease because:
a) they are susceptible for a speciﬁc listed disease or scientiﬁc evidence indicates that such
susceptibility is likely; or
b) they are vector species or reservoirs for that disease, or scientiﬁc evidence indicates that
such role is likely’.
For this reason, the assessment on Article 8 criteria is based on the evidence as extrapolated from
the relevant criteria of Article 7, i.e. the ones related to susceptible and reservoir species or routes of
transmission, which cover also possible role of biological or mechanical vectors.2 According to the
mapping, as presented in Table 5, Section 3.2 of the scientiﬁc opinion on the ad hoc methodology
(EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), the main animal species to be listed for Ebola virus disease according to
the criteria of Article 8(3) of the AHL are as displayed in Table 18.
Table 18: Main animal species to be listed for Ebola virus disease according to criteria of Article 8
(source: data reported in Section 3.1.1.1)
Class Order Family Genus/Species
Susceptible+ Mammalia Primates Hominidae Gorilla gorilla
Pan troglodytes
Cercopithecidae Macaca mulatta
Macaca fascicularis
Papio spp.
Chlorocebus pygerythrus
Cercopithecus aethiops
Callitrichidae Callithrix jacchus
Chiroptera Pteropodidae Epomops franqueti
Hypsignathus monstrosus
Myonycteris torquata
Rousettus aegyptiacus
Epomophorus wahlbergi
Molossidae Mops condylurus
Tadarida pumila
Chaerephon pumilus
Rodentia Muridae Mus setulosus
Praomys spp
Mus spp.*
Cricetidae Mesocricetus auratus*
Caviidae Cavia porcellus*
Eulipotyphla Soricidae Sylvisorex ollula
Carnivora Mustelidae Mustela putorius furo
Artiodactyla Bovidae Cephalophus dorsalis
Suidae Sus scrofa
2 A vector is a living organism that transmits an infectious agent from an infected animal to a human or another animal. Vectors
are frequently arthropods. Biological vectors may carry pathogens that can multiply within their bodies and be delivered to new
hosts, usually by biting. In mechanical vectors, the pathogens do not multiply within the vector, which usually remains infected
for shorter time than in biological vectors.
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4. Conclusions
TOR 1: for each of those diseases an assessment, following the criteria laid down in Article 7 of
the AHL, on its eligibility of being listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, Ebola complies with all criteria of the ﬁrst set
and with two criteria of the second set and therefore can be considered eligible to be listed for
Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL.
TOR 2a: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, an
assessment of its compliance with each of the criteria in Annex IV to the AHL for the purpose of
categorisation of diseases in accordance with Article 9 of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, Ebola meets the criteria as in sections 4 and 5 of
Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to
in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL.
TOR 2b: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, a list of
animal species that should be considered candidates for listing in accordance with Article 8 of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, the animal species that can be considered to be
listed for Ebola according to Article 8(3) of the AHL are some species of non-human primates,
pigs and rodents as susceptible species and some species of fruit bats as reservoir, as reported
in Table 18 in Section 3.4 of the present document.
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